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REQUIEM FOR RFRA: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL
RESPONSE
J Thomas Sullivan*
The outstanding presentations relating to the Supreme Court's decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores1 reflected in this symposium issue of the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock Law Journal raise a series of fascinating questions
concerning the role of Congress in enforcing individual rights and liberties.
The arguments focus on questions arising from the Court's apparent
reaffirmance of federalism principles and potential legislative response to the
holding which strikes down the use of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment2
as a vehicle for defining or expanding the First Amendment's guarantee of
religious freedom.3 The point of this essay is not to debate constitutional
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law, Copyright,
1998, by the author.
I appreciate the thoughtful comments of my colleagues, John M.A. DiPippa and Rod
Smith, who disagree with much of what I say on drafts of this essay. The essay represents my
political assessment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Symposium
might have benefitted from the shared thoughts of political scientists and sociologists, in
addition to the excellent legal thinking displayed by the invited speakers and authors. In order
to understand how some citizens might respond to the short but almost explosive history of
RFRA, it is important to consider non-legal points of view. The essay reflects personal history
and perspective, a peculiar mix of Restoration Christianity and liberal Democratic political
ideals. The mix may appear odd because the religious component suggests fundamentalism and
certain evangelical values commonly thought to be aligned with the religious right in this
country. The political component reflects a general premise that government can operate for
the good of society, but is typically compromised by economic influence and political
corruption. This mindset has no well-defined place in the current American political spectrum,
leading me to vote for Ralph Nader in the most recent Presidential election. For an historical
evaluation of the Restoration movement, see C. LEONARD ALLEN & RICHARD T. HUGHES,
DISCOVERING OUR ROOTS: THE ANCESTRY OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST (1988) and LESTER G.
MCALLISTER & WILLIAM E. TUCKER, JOURNEY IN FAITH: A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH (DISCIPLES OF CHRIST) (1975).
1. 117S.Ct.2157(1997).
2. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
3. At the heart of Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Boerne majority is a strict reading
of the nature of the grant of power to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly
Section 5, as a vehicle for enforcement of existing or predescribed rights, rather than
articulation of rights. In this sense, the Boerne Court adopted the prior view of Section 5 as
"remedial," following South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966):
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the
suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not
enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the
power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation.
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. The right enumerated in the First Amendment is stated broadly and
UALR LAW JOURNAL
principles with scholars of the caliber brought to our law school by this
conference. Rather, it is to suggest two alternative, and quite disparate, ways
of looking at the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),4 both
essentially political and philosophical in nature.
I. RFRA AND BELIEVERS
Professor Douglas Laycock developed a history of RFRA which sets the
Act in the context of a concerted legislative struggle by a coalition of pro-
religion, pro-liberties groups interested in achieving a comprehensive grant of
authority to challenge governmental action unduly burdening the free exercise
of religious belief and practice through litigation. The focus of these groups
was to produce a statutory vehicle furthering the interests of religious groups
and practitioners, as well as individual believers, in the public expression of
religious belief. Because the Act was not narrowly tailored to reach state action
infringing only upon private exercise of belief or conscience, the broader
implications of the legislation clearly carried a public component. This
component might lie in terms of general state action which ultimately infringes
upon expression of religious freedom in public contexts or in regulation which
directly impacts adversely on the operation of religious institutions. Boerne
must be seen as implicating the latter, since the zoning decision would not have
necessarily restricted any believing Roman Catholic from the exercise of their
religious beliefs, but instead merely limited the power of the institution to
expand its physical plant. In this sense, it is not religious exercise which is
impacted by the city's zoning ordinance, but the use of religious facilities for
the conduct of religious services that is really in issue.'
without precision as to specific practices to be protected or specified intrusions deemed
impermissible. The application of the Free Exercise protection has been the subject ofjudicial
interpretation, with the Court defining or explaining the exact nature of the right, rather than
relying simply on the text of the Amendment to supply direction for its enforcement. RFRA
did little more than recognize a broad right for litigation of claims perceived to properly flow
from the general guarantee of the First Amendment's language. It did so by lowering the
threshold of proof required for an aggrieved plaintiff to establish a violation of the basic
protection afforded by the First Amendment through legislative overruling of the Court's
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4 (1993).
5. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160. However, my colleague John DiPippa advises that he
knows someone who attends St. Peter's Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas, and who assures him
that the inadequacy of the facility impairs the ability of the parish to meet the worship needs of
its parishoners. This important fact is not apparent in the Court's opinion, which fails to
differentiate between governmental action that burdens religious practice directly and indirect
imposition which would logically occur anytime a zoning ordinance prevents a local religious
group from expanding its physical facility to accommodate its purposes. In the latter case, the
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This distinction is significant because it raises the fundamental distinction
between matters of personal conscience cast in a religious context which are
clearly protected by the Free Exercise Clause and other concerns that may be
characterized as secular in nature--the decision to construct a building,
whether for worship or parking--which are indistinguishable in significant
respects from those decisions made by non-religious entities. In this sense,
Boerne might be recast as an Establishment Clause case, in which the principal
issue would be whether the exception from the usual application of the city's
historic district zoning practice might be seen as furthering the interests of
religion in a manner inconsistent with the relative neutrality demanded by the
First Amendment.7
Just as RFRA may be characterized as concerned with the operation of
religious institutions as well as protection of the rights of individuals and
religious groups to maintain, share, and espouse particular religious beliefs, so
may it also be seen as a threat to the latter by some believers. One might
assume that the core value of the religious exercise clause of the First
Amendment clearly protects activities central to religious faith and practice.
In expanding upon the notion of protected activity to permit judicial resolution
of disputes in which the activity in issue is merely associated with religious
actors, but not central to matters of belief and worship, RFRA demanded too
much of secular institutions, reminding of us of Christ's admonition: "Render
therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God, the things that are
God's.",8 Moreover, among some believers, including this author, the RFRA
concept is hardly reassuring for a series of reasons.
governmental action may not result in any compromise of the ability of the religious entity to
fulfill its theological purposes. For example, a zoning regulation may preclude a church from
building a parking lot for practitioners who would otherwise park in other areas not owned or
controlled by the church.
6. Justice Stevens, concurring in Boerne, took this approach in arguing that RFRA was
a "law respecting an establishment of religion." Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
7. As Justice Stevens observed, application of RFRA in the Boerne factual context
permitted the church to utilize the statute as a "legal weapon" which would otherwise be
unavailable to an "atheist or agnostic." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 42-55 (1985)). This presupposes that RFRA precluded reliance by non-religious
groups on an alternative philososphical paradigm, such as secular humanism, since virtually
anything other than a rejection of religion will apparently qualify as a "religion" for First
Amendment purposes unless it is professed by a prison inmate. See, e.g., Theriault v. Silber,
453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (holding claimed religious belief a "masquerade" designed
to qualify for First Amendment protection for practices contrary to sound prison management
principles).
8. Matthew 22:21; cf. Mark 12:15-17; Luke 20:22-25.
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A. Submission of Questions of Conscience to Secular Validation
First, RFRA virtually invites secular regulation of religious belief and
practice by investing in the civil judiciary the duty to consider which policies
and practices of secular governmental entities unduly or substantially burden
the right to free exercise of religious belief ensured by the First Amendment.
At first glance, the legislation does no more than recognize the traditional role
of the judiciary in protecting religious freedom from governmental action.
Traditionally, secular judges have discharged their duties in this regard
cautiously and with appropriate deference to individual belief. But RFRA
seemingly expanded the potential forum for such claims, encompassing not
only claims which would have been brought in the absence of the statute, but
offering a vehicle that would encourage even more claims. As Professor Marci
Hamilton noted, RFRA provided prison inmates a new forum for litigating the
conditions of their confinement in the context of claims of religious oppression.
Her observation was confirmed by Professor Chip Lupu's research revealing
that 60 percent or more of the total claims filed alleging rights violations
cognizable under RFRA were brought by prison inmates. In short, RFRA was
likely to encourage religious freedom litigation among one of the most litigious
populations in American society.
The threat posed by expanded litigation is that typically associated with
all over-litigated types of claims: that the precision and thought with which
important issues are studied by judges will be compromised by a flood of
frivolous or marginal claims, draining important judicial resources from
consideration of meritorious claims. But this complaint about the volume of
litigation does not address the more important question of whether decisions
of religious, or indeed, moral conscience, should be resolved by officials who
serve the civil regime. Typically, elected and appointed judges share a
common perspective in which the preservation of order is central to their
administration. This perspective often predominates over their philosophical
and political views, so that liberals and conservatives alike tend to share a
common belief in the need for social stability reflected in orderly governmental
process.
It is this sense in which judicial disposition of disagreements in the
exercise of religious belief may be so threatening to believers. Because judges
are the instruments of secular institutions, committed to furthering an agenda
central to secularly-determined values-i.e., commitment to the "rule of law,"
as opposed to the "rule of God"--reservation of the role of arbiter to the
secular judge is fraught with the danger that the secular arbiter will discount the
significance or sincerity of the believer's claim. Decisions'about burdens
placed upon religious belief, practice or the operation of religious institutions
[Vol. 20
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necessarily suggest that the decisionmaker will evaluate the legitimacy of the
claim,9 often in a paternalistic fashion.'0
The purest cases of secular involvement in matters of personal conscience
arise in two contexts: first, when legislation is discriminatorily directed at a
particular religious practice or article of faith; and second, when a matter of
conscience compels non-compliance with a statutory directive resulting in
criminal prosecution." In the first instance, the discriminatory intent provides
the basis for the civil complaint and the legitimacy of the practice or belief is
not necessarily subject to formal validation by secular judges because the
discriminatory intent is unlawful if it violates First Amendment protections.
This situation is distinguishable from the assertion of civil claims under a
statutory scheme such as RFRA in which validation is essential to an ultimate
determination that the believer or practitioner may avoid the burden imposed
by law. In this context, the religious practitioner or believer petitions the
9. Secular judges must evaluate the merits of claimed religious belief, at least on some
occasions. For example, in Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1978), the court rejected a federal prison inmate's professed
adherence to the "Church of the New Song" as a religion, finding that it constituted a
"masquerade designed to obtain First Amendment protection for acts which otherwise would
be unlawful and/or reasonably disallowed by the various prison authorities but for the attempts
which have been and are being made to classify them as 'religious' and, therefore, presumably
protected by the First Amendment." Theriault, 453 F. Supp. at 260.
10. This paternalism is often evident when political liberals, tending to share a skeptical
perspective on religion, critically focus on publicly-religious figures who typically represent
the views or factions associated with the religious right. Liberals often attack the sincerity of
the religious belief espoused by these figures or the underlying beliefs themselves, even though
they would never apply the same standards to views espoused by African-Americans such as
Dr. Martin Luther King. For a political liberal to challenge Dr. King's belief system would be
to engage in political, if not religious, blasphemy. Some political conservatives who espouse
fundamentalist religious views, including the view that all humans are prone to sin, appear to
take particular pleasure in the suggestion that Dr. King was, in fact, prone to the same
temptations as other men.
11. For instance, the question of an individual's religious conscience was of foremost
concern in Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971) where the claim to conscientious objector
status by the heavyweight boxing champion, Muhammad Ali, was considered by the Supreme
Court. Ali's devotion to Islam was the basis for the claim, even though Islamic theological
principles do not prohibit participation in "war." In fact, the specific claim asserted by Ali was
that he was morally opposed to engaging in a war prosecuted by "non believers" based on his
allegiance to the Holy Qur'an. Ali's argument prompted an interesting discussion on the
concept of the "jihad," or holy war, by Justice Douglas, concurring. See id. at 706 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
Justice Douglas' conclusion demonstrates one problem posed by RFRA: "[W]hat Clay's
testimony adds up to is that he believes only in war as sanctioned by the Koran, that is to say,
a religious war against nonbelievers. All other wars are unjust." Id. at 709 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). He concluded that the claim was valid under the First Amendment, while
observing that "those schooled in a different conception of 'just' wars might find it quite
irrational." Id. at 710 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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secular authority for an exemption from the burdens claimed to flow from
operation of law based upon the validation of the belief or practice. While the
burden of satisfying the validation process may not be particularly great, some
cases will be lost because the secular court is not convinced that the believer
makes a compelling case for a finding of discrimination in fact, if not in intent.
In the context of criminal prosecutions, the accused does not solicit
secular validation of belief or practice preemptively through the filing of an
action seeking a declaration that the law imposes an unconstitutional burden.
Rather, the defendant asserts a defense which rests on his reasonable deference
to religious belief. 2 Or the accused may elect to present no defense at all,
suffering the burden of discrimination or prejudice without advancing an
argument that religious faith dictates a course of action in violation of the law.
This may occur because the criminal law recognizes no defensive theory
accommodating the believer's need to violate law. However, the acceptance
of the necessity or choice of evils line of defense may afford some defendants
an option of asserting their religious belief or practice as a defensive theory to
prosecution. Altematively, the believer may be able to plead lack of criminal
intent as a defensive theory where the actor's intent was motivated by religious
faith rather than by criminal culpability.
B. RFRA and Trivialization of Matters of Faith
Not only is the RFRA concept troubling because of its legislatively
imposed submission of matters of personal religious--and perhaps, non-
religious-conscience--to secular scrutiny, the broad sweep of the Act promised
secular consideration of a number of issues not constituting matters of religious
belief, faith or practice as matters protected by the First Amendment. Boerne
represents such an issue--whether the building plan for a church is subject to
First Amendment protection when in conflict with a general city zoning
scheme designed to achieve a secular aim.
If the fact-finder does not engage in an assessment of the authenticity of
a religious belief held by a litigant claiming impermissible government
infringement, as the Supreme Court's holding in Fowler v. Rhode Island3
12. For example, in the prosecution of Christian Scientists for negligent criminal acts in
failing to secure conventional medical care for their ailing children, the defendants may assert
lack of criminal intent based upon deference to the tenets of their system of belief. See, e.g.,
Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding convictions for
murder of Christian Science practitioners despite defense based on exercise of religious
freedom). The Church has set forth a defense of its practice in resorting only to spiritual healing
in a collection of essays. See THE FIRST CHURCH OF CHRIST, SCIENTIST, IN BOSTON, FREEDOM
AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989).
13. 345 U.S. 67 (1970).
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apparently precludes, then all claims are, in a sense, equally meritorious. 4 The
secular judicial system, having been admonished not to evaluate the doctrinal
merits of a claim, would be left to consider whether the claim was sincerely
held by the claimant. As Professors Beiner and DiPippa have noted, this
results in sincerity assessments performing a surrogate function for the
consideration of the merits of the tenet, belief, or practice claimed to be
embraced by the religion or religious group of which the claimant asserts
membership or affiliation. 5 Thus, in avoiding a determination on the
philosophical or doctrinal validity of the tenet, belief or practice giving rise to
the claim being litigated, the secular court merely assumes the facial validity
of all such claims of tenet, belief, or practice. This position of neutrality
devalues some religious expression by equating it with all religious expression.
RFRA extended this devaluation process by equating religious expression with
secular considerations which happened to be appended to preferences held by
religious groups within the meaning of the Act.
C. RFRA and the Specter of Religious Persecution
For some religious conservatives, evangelicals and fundamentalists, the
promise of RFRA rests not in the benefits of federally-imposed protection of
religious freedom, but rather, in the potential hastening of persecution of
religious practitioners from over-zealous enforcement of the Free Exercise
Clause at the expense of sound public policy. Boerne represents this type of
conflict, with the Church's desire for expansion in conflict with an otherwise
legitimate, or at least historically legitimate, exercise of the state's police power
to protect the integrity of property rights through zoning.
Ultimately, step-by-step subordination of the police power to the peculiar
needs of particular religious groups would likely have engendered an adverse
secular response.16 This is precisely what has happened with the use of court-
ordered school busing to achieve desegregation of the nation's public schools.
Regardless of the merits of forced busing as a means to further the goal of
Brown v. Board ofEducation,17 one can hardly deny the consequences of white
14. See id. at 70.
15. See Theresa M. Beiner & John M.A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 577, 599 (1997).
16. The Boerne Court noted the broad stroke with which Congress had painted the scope
of RFRA: "Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing
laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject
matter." Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In the second Brown decision, the Court




flight and destruction of the tax base funding public services, including public
education, in many urban areas attributable to the clear rejection of forced
busing by white families.'8 The impact, perhaps originally attributable to white
racism, has been the compromise of family education decisions for many white
and black parents who oppose segregation, but who choose suburban or private
schools out of concern that the educational mission of the public schools has
been compromised in furtherance of a national political agenda. These parents
may support integration but are not prepared to subject their children to inferior
schools fraught with the perception of increasing problems of drugs, violence
and interracial conflict to make a marginal contribution to the achievement of
an agenda for which they may feel no culpable responsibility.
Fundamentalist and evangelical Christians often argue that the American
political system oppresses the practice of the Christian faith, contrasting
intolerance for fundamentalist or evangelical Christianity with open acceptance
of virtually all other religious activity. They may also suspect that official
persecution of the Christian church will eventually foreshadow fulfillment of
prophecy concerning the second coming of Jesus Christ.' 9 The widespread use
of RFRA as a means of interjecting secular authority to promote the interests
of religious groups or believers would lead to the backlash of rejection that
might transform negative public opinion into oppression.2°
18. See Robert R. Wright, On its Anniversary: A Look Back at Brown v. Board of
Education, ARK. L., Summer 1994, at 51. Professor Wright argued that the forced
desegregation through busing not only served to drive majority families from the public
schools, but also resulted in a wealth-based segregation in which majority and minority families
with sufficient economic resources abandoned the public schools in favor of private schools,
leaving poorer families to rely on public education for their children. The potential for
jeopardizing educational opportunities of minority children inherent in implementation practices
which may compromise the quality of educational experience has been recognized by other
commentators. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
19. See, e.g., HAL LINDSEY, PLANET EARTH-2000 A.D. 267-80 (1994). Lindsey, the
popular fundamentalist Christian author of THE LATE GREAT PLANET EARTH published some
25 years earlier, predicts a time when the Christian church will be subjected to official
oppression. Lindsey draws support for his perception of growing hostility toward basic
Christian beliefs within the secular community in 2 Timothy 3:12: "All that will live Godly in
Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution." Other fundamentalists view much of the prophecy of
oppression of the Christian church, including the book of Revelation, to refer to violent
treatment of Christians by the Roman state in the centuries following the execution of Jesus.
20. Equally troubling from this perspective is the determination of a secular judge to
display the Ten Commandments in his Alabama courtroom. This reference to Judeo-Christian
heritage is not immediately offensive to believing Jews and Christians, but it sends a troubling
message to litigants who might reasonably question whether the court's commitment is to
administering the law under the Constitution, or to imposing justice drawn from the judge's
personal understanding of the Commandments. If the judge permits the Commandments to
predominate over application of positive law, then the litigant may be deprived of a just ruling
promised by the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the judge subordinates his fidelity to the
[Vol. 20
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Moreover, the accommodation of theological and secular interests of all
potential groups who might seek the broad protection afforded by RFRA would
lead to disenchantment within the religious community once the initial victories
established the preeminence of religious belief and practice in the formulation
and implementation of public policy. Within the community that would self-
identify as "religious," there is significant disagreement that seldom erupts into
strife precisely because the government is not actively involved in protecting
the individual interests of groups within that broader community.1 Once
public policy would be shaped by RFRA-based litigation, those interests might
well surface in terms of competing interests within individual lawsuits as some
religious actors seek to intervene in opposition to the result sought by other
groups having conflicting theological or social agendas.
For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah," the Court struck down governmental regulation which targeted the
religious group's practice of animal sacrifice by imposing public health
regulations designed to limit this practice to licensed, inspected slaughter-
houses. The decision turned on the Court's assessment of the motivation for
adoption of the regulation as discriminatory in intent, essentially "targeting" the
religious belief and practice of the group and concluding that such discrimina-
tion is never permissible.23 Presumably, had the regulation been void of
evidence of discriminatory intent, it would have withstood challenge under the
prevailing rule of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith,24 as justified by its "generally applicable prohibition[s] of
socially harmful conduct., 25 However, under RFRA, the test imposed for
consideration of religious liberty claims would have required the courts to
uphold the church's right to continue the practice of animal sacrifice if the
Commandments in rendering a decision dictated by the secular law, he may suggest supremacy
of secular law in matters of conscience which serve to undermine the very display of the
Commandments in the courtroom. In the courtroom, every litigant should be assured that
decisions are rendered in accordance with the secular law and Constitution, rather than the trial
judge's personal allegiance to any other source of law. See Mark Hansen, Decalogue Debate
Back to Square One: Alabama High Court Refuses to Decide Case on Ten Commandments in
Courtrooms, A.B.A. J., March 1998, at 22; State v. ACLU ofAlabama, No. CV-95-919, 1998
WL 21985 (Ala. 1998) (dismissing declaratory judgment action as lacking controversy).
21. One unresolved question which would have been posed by RFRA litigation is the
extent to which its protections would have been available to non-religious or anti-religious
individuals asserting claims based on matters of conscience. These individuals have been
afforded protection for their beliefs in certain contexts, such as employment. See Charlotte
Elizabeth Parsons, Doing Justice and Loving Kindness: A Comment on Hostile Environments
and the Religious Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 643 n.2 (1997).
22. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
23. See id. at 533.
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
25. Id. at 885.
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health regulation could not be supported by a compelling justification or if a
less restrictive means of furthering that interest was available to government.
Presumably, the local health authorities could have imposed less intrusive
inspections of the church facility to protect against spread of disease if their
interest in regulating the activity was compelling and not directed at the church
or its practitioners in a discriminatory manner.
The question is whether religious groups that do not recognize animal
sacrifice as theologically valid would be more concerned about the Court's
treatment of the practice in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye if intervention to
protect such practices was, in fact, the norm rather than the exception. RFRA
was designed to aggressively foster the claims of both non-traditional and
traditional religious groups and practitioners. Consequently, reliance on the
courts would have affirmatively interjected government into the enforcement
of religious claims by competing groups. Ultimately, where these interests
conflict, the secular judicial system, rather than individual conscience, would
be the primary vehicle for resolving that conflict. The free marketplace of
belief Americans have traditionally enjoyed might well become the type of
over-regulated market that threatens religious and personal autonomy.
True religious strife involving violence invites government repression of
that religious expression which supports violence. That is apparent in the
recent governmental investigation into political bombings suspected to be
linked to the Christian Identity Movement, a racist and violently anti-abortion,
anti-homosexual fundamentalist group.26 So long as violence or mass
disturbance is reflected in the doctrine of extremist groups alone, systematic
governmental repression of religious practice remains unlikely. But the
increasing heterogeneity of the American religious community suggests greater
26. The Christian Identity Movement has a documented history of relationship to radical,
and often violent, political activity in opposition to established government. Most recently, it
has been identified as a potential source of support for a suspect wanted in the bombing of a
Birmingham abortion clinic which resulted in the death of an off-duty police officer working
as a security guard at the clinic. See Sylvester Monroe et al., Mountain Manhunt; The FBI
names a suspect in the bombing of an Alabama abortion clinic. But can he be found? TIME,
Feb. 23, 1998. The movement has previously been linked to other incidents involving ultra-
fundamentalist right-wing religious groups, such as the seizure of arms and ammunition from
the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord group operating in Arkansas in the mid-
1980's. See Richard N. Ostling, A Sinister Search for "Identity"; Far-Right Groups use
Theology to Justify Violence and Racism. TIME, Oct. 20, 1986. The Identity Movement is also
linked to the Posse Comitatus, whose leader, Gordon Kahl, was killed in an explosion in
Arkansas in 1983, during a gun battle with federal officers following the death of two federal
marshals who had attempted to serve him with a warrant in North Dakota. See Robert T. Zintl,




potential for strife, particularly if some groups come to believe that the
government favors competing religious doctrines or groups of practitioners.27
Thus, in inviting further governmental intrusion into the uneasy
relationship between the state and religion, RFRA expanded the role of
government in a way that has the potential to disturb an inherently conflict-
laden but generally stable relationship. To the extent that the intent of the Act
was propounded as beneficial to religion, the benefit of further governmental
protection or official sanction of religious belief and practice could have led to
anti-religious reaction demanding represssion of the expanded liberty accorded
religious groups by RFRA, or intra and inter-religious conflict. This latter
conflict has generally not been a feature of American political life under pre-
RFRA legal doctrine enforcing a flexible tradition of separation of secular
activities of the state and religious belief and practice of the subscribing
citizenry.
II. RFRA's DISTORTED POLITICAL AGENDA
The popularity of RFRA as a legislative enterprise suggests its potential
for political currency outside the Congress. The overwhelming vote favoring
its passage is indicative of more than bi-partisan support for religious belief.
In fact, one might readily assume that a vote against RFRA was tantamount to
a vote against the flag, although even the history of the flag-burning cases
reflects a more even public debate and Congressional vote demonstrating
serious concern for the wisdom of legislating against free speech.
For politically-skeptical believers, RFRA appears to have been designed
to serve the political interest of conservatives appealing to believing voters
rather than as a necessary or even desirable legislative vehicle for affirming the
role of religion in our national life.
A. The "Payoff" for Religious Conservatives
One political reality hidden in the RFRA history is that the statute
satisified an important political debt to well-organized conservative Christian
voters and interests groups once the conservative Republican party expanded
its influence in Congress in 1992.2' Despite the substantial electoral mandate
27.. One might note the violence which has strained other national populations as a result
of strife between Sikhs and Hindus (India), Moslems and Jews (Israel and the semi-autonomous
Palenstinian territory) and Protestants and Catholics (Northern Ireland) to suggest that religious
co-tolerance is not necessarily the norm, even in democratic states.
28. For example, note one political scientist's observation:
Over the past two decades[,] .. the political evolution of evangelical Protestants
1998]
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enjoyed by Presidents Reagan and Bush during the decade of the 1980's, their
power was not translated into national policy favoring the positions of many
Christian conservatives on two key issues: abortion 29 and school prayer.
While pro-choice advocates and strong proponents of separation and state
may have correctly anticipated well-organized assaults on judicial pronounce-
ments reinforcing a "right" to seek an abortion and a preclusion of Christian
prayer in the public schools, the assault did not threaten the Court's consistent
positions in these two areas. Instead, political observers might well have
concluded that the conservative agenda, as reflected in the Reagan and Bush
presidencies, effectively promoted strong national defense and a general
limitation on federal power, relegating the questions of abortion and school
prayer to a secondary concern. The more cynical view would be that
conservatives deliberately avoided major battles on abortion and school prayer
for fear of splitting their power base, or impeding the numerical growth of the
conservative movement by emphasizing policies restricting personal autonomy
instead of the more appealing issues of defense and promised tax relief
achieved through a diminished domestic role of the federal government.
Whether unable or unwilling to deliver on the promise of a change in
national policy on abortion and school prayer-the two most visible political
has forced political scientists to reconsider those conclusions [about the increasing
secularization of American society]. Evangelicals are members of theologically
conservative, white, Protestant denominations, such as the Baptists, Pentacostals,
Church of God, Assemblies of God, and Church of Christ. They tend to see the
Bible as uniquely authoritative in matters of religious faith, to see adult conversion
experiences as necessary for salvation, and to be committed to evangelizing or
"spreading the word." Once nominally Democratic but largely apolitical,
evangelicals have become the most consistent supporters of the Republican Party,
and their political movement---the Christian right--has taken over the G.O.P. in
many parts of the country.
Geoffrey C. Layman, Religious Beliefs and Politics: Better Measures are Needed, THE
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Mar. 13, 1998, at B4-5.
However, the description of these church groups as "white" is clearly incorrect. Within
some communities, congregations remain essentially segregated but all of the denominations
cited are informally integrated and none espouses a doctrine of segregation in worship.
29. The abortion controversy which raged through the last two decades was highlighted
by two significant events in the history of the UALR School of Law. In 1988, while visiting
the campus during a Jurists-in-Residence program, then Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun
told the press that he feared an increasingly conservative Supreme Court would eventually
overrule the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which he had authored. See George
Wells, Jurist Sees Threat to Abortion Ruling, ARK. GAZETrE, Nov. 14, 1988, at I B. During his
presidential campaign three years later, then-Governor Bill Clinton made his dramatic
announcement in the law library of the Old Federal Building, then a part of the UALR Law
School campus, that if elected he would nominate only pro-choice justices to the Supreme
Court. See Noel Oman, 'One Justice Away'from past, Clinton warns, ARK. DEMOCRAT-




objectives of the Christian right-the growing conservative bloc in Congress
instead substituted RFRA, a statute designed to appeal to most believing voters.
The timing of the bill forced Congressional representatives and senators facing
re-election in 1994 to consider the likely impact of a negative vote on the
legislation. While liberals in either party were unlikely to experience dramatic
opposition based on a favorable RFRA vote, a negative vote would have
provided an additional emotional issue for conservative challengers seeking to
tie incumbents to an "anti-religion, anti-First Amendment, secular" philosophi-
cal position. The potential for misuse of an anti-RFRA vote would have been
dramatic, while a vote in favor of the Act would have defused the issue with
fewer unfavorable consequences.
This is not to suggest that many proponents of RFRA did not undertake
their legislative duties with unimpeachable integrity. However, the political
sensitivity to matters important to the Religious Right certainly offered the
patina of "good politics" to legislation which might have inspired more debate,
particularly from representatives concerned about the potential burdens RFRA
held for state and local governments. That concern was not reflected in the
final vote, even if it surfaced earlier in Congressional debate. Curiously, the
overwhelming Congressional vote in favor of RFRA is never mentioned in the
opinions filed in the case." Only judges and lawyers would conclude that the
vote is irrelevant to a consideration of the constitutionality of the measure.
B. Prisoners' Rights Under RFRA: The Lightning Rod
If RFRA were intended to serve as a vehicle for affirming First Amend-
ment principles, rather than as a careful manipulation of the Christian right, one
might suppose its proponents would have insulated the legislation from its
greatest potential vulnerability.31 That vulnerability was its inherent potential
30. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1994). The overwhhelming Congressional support for
RFRA is summed up by the authors:
On October 27, 1993, the U.S. Senate passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (RFRA) by a vote of 97-3. The House of Representatives, after passing a
similar bill by unanimous voice vote on May 11, 1993, passed the Senate version
of the bill on November 3, and President Clinton signed it into law on November
16.
Id. at 210 nn. 2-5.
31. RFRA is not the only "rights affirming" federal legislation that runs into trouble in the
prisoner's rights context. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998), to review the Third Circuit's holding that the
Americans with Disabilities Act is applicable to state prison programs. The inmate had been
denied admission to a prison boot camp program because of a history of hypertension. See
Yeskey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997).
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for misuse in generating frivolous litigation concerning the virtues of religious
freedom. Professor Chip Lupu suggested the problem in documenting the
dispositional success of actions undertaken under the Act.
Professor Lupu stressed that the majority of actions relying on RFRA had
been filed by prison inmates and that at least 60 percent of RFRA decisions had
been rendered in these cases.32 In state court litigated claims, prisoners lost in
all five reported actions, while the win/loss ratio in federally litigated actions
stood at nine to eighty-five.33 Professor Lupu attached less significance to the
fact that the win/loss ratios in non-prisoner cases stood at seven to eleven in
state tried actions and nine to forty-one in federally tried cases.
34
Far from demonstrating RFRA's lack of impact, the victory totals seem
impressive for actions commenced under relatively new legislation not blessed
by a history of prior judicial review or favorable Supreme Court decisions. In
contrast, Professor Lupu suggested that RFRA served primarily to afford
inmates a new litigation strategy. This point was affirmed anecdotally by
Professor Marci Hamilton, who noted the complaint of an inmate correspon-
dent that her opposition to RFRA might cost him a theory for recourse to the
courts to challenge the conditions of his confinement.35
One important issue is why Congress would have jeopardized the
legislative enterprise by not excluding prisoner actions from the broad
protections afforded by RFRA.36 In fact, such a move was rejected during the
The ADA, like RFRA, poses significant accommodation problems for local, state and federal
government, because of its broad sweep. Application to state prisons, which might be exempted
from coverage by the Eleventh Amendment, could galvanize public support for significant
legislative retrenchment in this area, given the significant economic costs related to compliance
with the Act's requirements in both public and private sectors.
32. See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LrITLE ROCK L.J 575, 591 (1998).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Professor Marci Hamilton, Address at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
Symposium (Sept. 19 & 20, 1997).
36. Congressional failure to exclude or limit prisoner litigation aimed at prison
administration would appear to have undone much of the judicially-imposed limitation on
inmate claims achieved by the Court in several of its decisions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976) (requiring proof of "deliberate indifference" on part of prison officials to establish
Eighth Amendment claims based on deprivation of medical treatment); Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981) (holding negligent failure of prison officials to follow procedures resulting in
loss of inmate property does not create § 1983 claim if a state tort remedy is otherwise
available); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding inmate has no right to expectation
of privacy in cell under Fourth Amendment); Turner v, Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding
prison regulations may infringe on protected rights if reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding state may forcibly
administer antipsychotic medication if necessary to maintain institutional safety); Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (holding claim that institutional punishment violates Eighth
Amendment requires showing of "deliberate indifference"); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343
(1996) (requiring states to provide access to basic legal materials for inmates, rather than prison
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discussion of the bill. A RFRA proponent might argue that the Act would have
little value if its benefits were denied to a substantial segment of the popula-
tion, one often in need of religious expression.
The denial of prisoner access to the courts to vindicate claims under
RFRA should have proved philosophically fatal to the Act because it would
suggest nothing less than that protection of First Amendment values could be
arbitrarily denied on the basis of one's status as a prisoner. Yet, imprisonment
does entail acceptable curtailment on civil rights and liberties in a variety of
constitutional contexts. One might argue that exclusion of prisoner claims
would exact no greater burden than recognition that inmates suffer loss of
liberty when imprisoned. Moreover, while imprisonment may compromise an
individual's right to engage in religious practices consistent with the need for
institutional security, it does not entail an impairment of the power to believe
in a particular doctrine or world-view.
The problem with this analysis is that RFRA created no substantive rights;
instead, it is a procedural vehicle for validating claims brought under the Free
Exercise Clause.37 Unlike other losses of liberties suffered by inmates,
preclusion of inmate claims under RFRA would not have resulted because of
the need to adjust liberty expectations for the loss occasioned by imprisonment,
but in a denial of an equal opportunity to litigate the substantive issues.
In a political sense, the failure to preclude prisoner litigation should
compromise the long-term viability of the Act. The statistics cited by Professor
Lupu are precisely those likely to be relied upon by opponents of RFRA to
criticize its wide sweep. At a point in history when most of the electorate
appears ready to support the concept of incarceration as the primary device for
securing public safety, any legislative enactment empowering inmates to
challenge the operation of prison systems would hardly be expected to be
favorably received.
Religious exercise rights claimed by inmates could be accommodated
without recourse to RFRA as they had been in pre-RFRA prisoner rights
litigation.38 That option would have recognized a distinction between "core"
law libraries). These decisions are representative of a steady trend of cases in which prison
litigation has been restricted either through imposing rigorous burdens of proof or limiting
access to litigation tools.
37. The district court observed: "RFRA only mentions the First Amendment as the
empowering provision to change the burden of proof standard to compelling interest." Flores
v. City of Boeme, 877 F. Supp. 355, 357 n.l (W.D. Tex. 1995). The district court nevertheless
struck the Act as unconstitutional in violating the doctrine of Separation of Powers in Congress'
effort to overturn the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith. See id.
38. See, e.g., Church of the New Song v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayers' Money
in the Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 620 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit described the
individual plaintiff as follows:
Harry W. Theriault, the founder and chief exponent of the Church of the New Song,
1998]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
rights protected by the First Amendment which might be the focus of inmate
litigation and "peripheral rights" recognized under RFRA but not available to
inmates because of statutory preclusion of that particular class of plaintiffs.
C. Boerne as a Preemptive Assault on Homosexual Rights Initiatives
One final question remains with regard to understanding the Court's
holding in Boerne: what does the majority's position suggest with regard to
other legislative initiatives to protect First Amendment rights? Will the
decision remain a definitive statement of the Court's sentiment only with
respect to this particular type of legislation, or does it signal a broader concern?
The current Court has demonstrated some willingness to embark on new
threshholds of review, only to delay or retreat in expansion of its position to
reconsider other legislative directives. The most significant example is its
treatment of federal firearms legislation in United States v. Lopez,39 in which
a close majority of the Court voided a provision criminalizing possession of a
firearm in proximity to a school.' Lopez suggested a new perspective on
Congress's authority to use the Commerce Clause power to criminalize activity
traditionally dealt with under state law.4' While litigants rushed to rely on
Lopez to review a broad variety of claims, neither the Supreme Court nor the
circuits have demonstrated a willingness to engage in a broader discourse on
the legitimacy of commerce-based federal criminalization of street crimes or
reversal of lengthy histories of affirmance of convictions under those statutory
provisions.42
is a federal prison inmate who has a protracted history of litigation in the federal
courts concerning the exercise of his faith in prison. Indeed, it appears that almost
all of the followers of his faith are prison inmates.
Id. at 649. In rejecting the plaintiff church's claim to protection under the First Amendment,
the court relied on a prior determination by the United States District Court, Western District
of Texas, that concluded that the church was actually a "sham religion." Id. at 652 (citing
Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254, 260 (W.D. Tex. 1978)).
The circuit court also observed that the individual plaintiff had extensive experience in
challenging the operation of the prison system through litigation, noting: "In addition to the
cases discussed in this opinion, Theriault has been involved in numerous lawsuits as either a
plaintiff complaining of prison conditions or as a defendant being prosecuted for unruly prison
conduct." Id. at 655 n.5 (citations omitted).
39. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
40. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)).
41. See, e.g., Symposium, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 633 (1997) (participants characterizing Lopez as landmark decision with far-
reaching federalism implications).
42. See Brent E. Newton, Lopez in the Fifth Circuit: Watershed or Aberration?, 15 FIFTH
CIRCUIT REP. 209 n. 1 (Feb. 1998) (analyzing Fifth Circuit's treatment of Lopez-based claims
following the Supreme Court's affirmance of its holding in United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342
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However, Boerne might have preemptively spoken to the issue of
protection of homosexual rights through Congressional enactment of new civil
rights legislation furthering the protections afforded by the First Amendment.
The Court would have been aware that the issue of legislative or constitutional
recognition of sexual preference was on the table of public discussion in many
states.43 The Court's decision in Romer v. Evans" addressed the issue in a
related context, in considering whether state constitutional action could serve
to preclude protection for sexual preference as a matter of legal and public
policy. At the same time, the Court recognized that efforts of gay rights
advocates would undoubtedly focus on congressional protection of sexual
preference in the future.45
A conservative Court, concerned that pressure on the legislative branch
might result in a response seeking to institutionalize sexual preference as an
actional basis in anti-discrimination litigation, could have viewed Boerne as a
relatively safe opportunity to preempt the field with precedent that superficially
represents a morality-neutral view of legislative power. Thus, any future
attempt to legislate protection for sexual preference could be linked with
Boerne's theme of limitation in any attempt to expand upon the express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights without the need to directly address the
question of homosexual rights. When the Court confronted that question in
Bowers v. Hardwick,46 a bare numerical majority upheld the right of states to
criminalize homosexual activity, even though it did so on the basis of a
Georgia statute which did not purport to differentiate between homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy.47 A more conservative Boerne Court, concerned about
being perceived as too out-of-line with national sentiment on this issue, might
have viewed Boerne as an opportunity to craft a position which could
ultimately be used to preclude protective legislation favoring less conservative
elements in American society than those which supported RFRA."
(5th Cir. 1993) (declaring 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) unconstitutional)).
43. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting political
activity favoring recognition of sexual preference as subject for political protection). The
Romer majority observed that the Colorado constitutional amendment under review had been
adopted in apparent response to municipal ordinances in Aspen, Boulder and the City and
County of Denver banning discrimination based upon sexual orientation. See id. at 623-24.
44. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
45. See id. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting prior attempts to include sexual
preference as basis for protection in federal civil rights legislation rejected by Congress).
46. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
47. Because the Court focused on the homosexual element of the case, rather than the
constitutionality of the proscription of sodomy, the dissenting justices in Bowers were highly
critical of the way in which the majority reached the issue ultimately decided. See id. at 199,
200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 214, 218-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




Things are not always what they appear to be.4
both the majority opinions in Romer and Boerne, which may suggest that he would be adverse
to a legislative attempt aimed at protection of sexual orientation within the context of broad
civil rights legislation. On the other hand, his opinion in Romer might also indicate his
commitment to a neutral position on this point in which neither discrimination nor preference
based upon orientation would be appropriate.
49. Jesus warned: "And many false prophets will arise, and will mislead many." Matthew
24:11.
812 [Vol. 20
